Hardy L. Thomas, Esq. (St. Bar No. 37727)

LAW OFFICES OF HARDY L. THOMAS, a PC

6101 West Century Boulevard, Suite 200        

Los Angeles, CA 90045

Telephone:  310/568-4177

 

Attorneys for Plaintiff

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WESTERN DIVISION

 

Kurt E. Matthews, an Individual,

 

                        Plaintiff,

                             vs.

 

City of Torrance, a municipal corporation; James D. Herren, as Chief of Police for the City of Torrance; Richard D. Bongard as Fire Chief for the City of Torrance; Robert Millea, an individual; Doug Byrne, an individual, Nathan Norris, an individual; James Elingson, an indivual; Christopher Valentino, an individual, John Spindler, an individual; Torrance) Memorial Medical Center, a California Non-Profit corporation; Mary Doost, M.D., an individual; Del Amo Hospital, Inc., a California corporation; Claude Friedmann, M.D., an individual; Steven Prover, M.D., an individual; Irene Wojec, RN; and DOES 1 through 50

                        Defendants.

 

 

 

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 CASE NO.

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR:

ASSAULT;

BATTERY; 

INTENTIONAL USE OF UNDUE FORCE; 

INTENTIONAL AND NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS; 

TRESPASS; 

FALSE IMPRISONMENT;

DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW; 

DEFAMATION; 

RALPH ACT VIOLATIONS; 

BANE ACT VIOLATIONS; 

LANTERMAN-PETRIS ACT VIOLATIONS; 

VIOLATIONS OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (42 U.S.C., §12101 et seq.); 

VIOLATIONS OF 42 USCA SECTION 1983; FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY SUPERVISE; AND:

CONSPIRACY

 

 

                JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

 

Plaintiff alleges:

NATURE OF THE CASE

 

            1.         This is a case for physical and mental harm against certain Torrance police and fire officers and other Torrance City officials against Plaintiff Kurt E. Matthews for being an alleged homosexual, for asserting his constitutional and legal rights, and for recompense for the subsequent acts of brutality and retribution inflicted on Plaintiff for filing a claim against the City of Torrance charging its officers and firemen with the commission of tortious acts against Plaintiff.  It also involves two hospitals and certain staff members who, acting at the direction of the Torrance law enforcement officers, illegally caused Plaintiff to be detained as “mentally disordered” for a cumulative period of thirteen days against his will, incapacitated and given unconsented anti-psychotic and other medications and violation of applicable law that deprived Plaintiff of his ability to reason, perceive the wrongs inflicted upon him and to have the services of an attorney to represent him.  It is also alleged that none of the involved police and fire officers were adequately supervised or trained in accordance with the relevant provisions of the California Penal Code and the regulations promulgated thereunder by the Commission on Police Officers Standards and Training (herein “POST”).  Plaintiff now seeks relief from the Court in connection with these unlawful acts. 

PARTIES

            2.         At all relevant times, Plaintiff Kurt E. Matthews has been, and is now, a resident of the City of Torrance, Los Angeles County, California.  His wife died on February 5, 2004, and he lives alone with his now 16 year-old son.  His son was 14 years-old at all relevant times for purposes of this complaint. 

3.                  Defendant City of Torrance (“City”) is, and at all times material was, a charter city and a political subdivision of the State of California, duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of California and located in the County of Los Angeles, California. 

4.                  Defendant James D. Herren is an individual and, on information and belief, at all times herein mentioned was a resident of Los Angeles County, California employed by the City of Torrance.  He is sued herein in his capacity as the Chief of Police for the City of Torrance; 

5.                  Defendant  Richard D. Bongard is an individual and, on information and belief, at all times herein mentioned was a resident of Los Angeles County, California employed by the City of Torrance.  He is sued herein in his capacity as the Fire Chief for the City of Torrance; 

6.                  Defendant Robert J. Millea (“Millea”) is an individual and, on information and belief, at all times herein mentioned was a resident of Los Angeles County, California employed by the City of Torrance; 

7.                  Defendant Doug Byrne is an individual and, on information and belief, at all times herein mentioned was a resident of Los Angeles County, California employed by the City of Torrance; 

8.                  Defendant Nathan Norris is an individual and, on information and belief, at all times herein mentioned was a resident of Los Angeles County, California employed by the City of Torrance; 

9.                  Defendant James Elingson is an individual and, on information and belief, at all times herein mentioned was a resident of Los Angeles County, California employed by the City of Torrance; 

10.              Defendant Christopher Valentino is an individual and, on information and belief, at all times herein mentioned was a resident of Los Angeles County, California employed by the City of Torrance; 

11.              Defendant John Spindler (“Spindler”) is an individual and at all times herein mentioned was a resident of Los Angeles County, California. 

12.              Defendant Torrance Memorial Medical Center (“TMMC”) is, and at all times material was, a not-for-profit corporation, duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of California, having its principal place of business in the County of Los Angeles, California. 

13.              Defendant Mary C. Doost, M.D. (“Doost”) is an individual and, on information and belief, at all times herein mentioned was a resident of Los Angeles County, California, and was and is associated with TMMC, acting within the course and scope of her association with Defendant TMMC. 

14.              On information and belief, Defendant Del Amo Hospital (“Del Amo”) is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of California, having its principal place of business in the County of Los Angeles, California. 

15.              Defendant Claude Friedmann, M.D. (“Friedman”) is an individual and, on information and belief, is and at all times herein mentioned was a resident of Los Angeles County, California, employed by, or contractually associated with, Defendant Del Amo, and acting within the course and scope of his employment and/or association with Del Amo. 

16.              Defendant Steven Prover, M.D. (“Prover”) is an individual and, on information and belief, is and at all times herein mentioned was a resident of Los Angeles County, California, and employed by, or contractually associated with, Defendant Del Amo and acting within the course and scope of his employment and/or association with Del Amo.

17.              Defendant Irene Wojec, RN (“Wojec”) is an individual and, on information and belief, is and at all times herein mentioned was a resident of Los Angeles County, California, employed by Defendant Del Amo and acting within the course and scope of her employment at Del Amo. 

18.              Defendants Does 1 through 50, inclusive, are sued herein under fictitious names.  Their true names and capacities are unknown to Plaintiff.  When their true names and capacities are ascertained, Plaintiff will amend this complaint by inserting their true names and capacities herein.  Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that each of the fictitiously named Defendants is responsible in some manner for the occurrences herein alleged, and that Plaintiff’s damages as herein alleged were proximately caused by those  Defendants.  Each reference in this complaint to “Defendant,” “Defendants,” or a specifically named Defendant refers also to all Defendants sued under fictitious names. 

19.              Defendants Does 1 through 15, inclusive, are, and at all times herein mentioned were, employed by Defendant City as law enforcement officers and, in doing the things hereinafter alleged, were acting under the color and authority of Defendant City and within the course and scope of their employment 

20.              Defendants Herren, Millea and Does 16 through 30, inclusive, are, and at all times herein mentioned were, employed by Defendant City as firemen and policemen, and in doing the things hereinafter alleged, were acting under the color and authority of Defendant City and within the course and scope of their employment.  Defendants City, Herren, Millea and Does 1 through 30 are hereinafter sometimes referred to as the “City Defendants.” 

21.              Defendants Does 31 through 40, inclusive, are, and at all times herein mentioned were, employed by Defendant TMMC, and in doing the things hereinafter alleged were acting within the course and scope of their employment.  Defendants TMMC, Doost and Does 31 through 40 are hereinafter sometimes referred to as the “TMMC Defendants.” 

22.              Defendants Friedmann, Prover and Wojec and  Does 41 through 50, inclusive, are, and at all times herein mentioned were, employed by, or otherwise associated with, Defendant Del Amo, and in doing the things hereinafter alleged were acting within the course and scope of their employment.  Defendants Del Amo, Friedman, Wojec and Does 41 through 50 are hereinafter sometimes referred to as the “Del Amo Defendants.” 

Defendants TMMC, Does 51 through 60 are hereinafter sometimes referred to as the “TMMC Defendants”. The TMMC Defendants and the Del Amo Defendants are hereinafter sometimes referred to collectively as the “Hospital Defendants.” 

 

23.              Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at all times herein mentioned each of the Defendants, including all Defendants sued under fictitious names, were the agents and/or employees of each of the remaining Defendants, and in doing the things herein alleged, and unless otherwise alleged, were acting within the course and scope of this agency and employment. 

JURISDICTION

24.              This Court has jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. §1331 because this action arises under, inter alia, the Due Processand Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §1983 et seq.); and the Americans With Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§12101 et. seq. 

25.              This Court has jurisdiction over the state common law claims asserted in this action under 28 U.S.C. §1367 because the state-law claims are so related to the claims arising under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 42 U.S.C.A. §12101 et seq. and the Constitutional claims cited that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. 

VENUE

26.              Venue is proper in this Judicial District with respect to all Defendants under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) because (1) all of the acts, events, statements and omissions occurred in this Judicial District and (2) Plaintiffs are informed and believe that all of the Defendants reside in this Judicial District and all Defendants reside in the State of California. 

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

27.              The actions of the City Defendants as described in this complaint occurred within Los Angeles County, California, and constitute "state action" as that term has been interpreted by relevant case law. 

28.              On June 26, 2003, Plaintiff was adjudged totally and permanently disabled by the Social Security Administration due to chronic fatigue, severe depression and a bi-polar II condition that forced him to permanently retire.  He was determined to be under a disability since April 24, 2002 and entitled to disability benefits under the Social Security Act (20 CFR 404.1520(f)) from and after that date.  Plaintiff lives alone with his son, Ryan, in the home he owns in Torrance, CA.

The March 16 Incident: Arrest for “Suicidal Ideation” (11-Day Involuntary Confinement.

29.              As of March 16, 2005, Plaintiff was being treated by a psychiatrist for depression and manic behavior.  As of that date, Plaintiff had not taken his prescribed medication for approximately five days and was alternatively moderately manic and depressed within short periods of time.  This condition is called “rapid cycling.”  Plaintiff saw a high profile evangelist on television and wondered how that man would handle a depressed person.  Plaintiff called and insisted on talking to the evangelist himself, but was transferred to a call screener instead.  On information and belief, the screener called the Buena Park Police and told them that Plaintiff had “suicidal ideation” or was suicidal; the Buena Park Police Department, in turn, relayed this information to the Torrance Police. 

30.              Shortly thereafter, two uniformed Torrance police officers (Does 1 and 2) rang Plaintiff’s front doorbell.  They told Plaintiff that they had information that they received a telephone call that he intended to commit suicide.  Plaintiff firmly denied it.  They then entered his home without permission and without warrant.  The police officers then began asking questions about suicide such as whether he had a plan, how he would accomplish it if he did and whether Plaintiff had any pills.  Plaintiff showed them his prescribed medications for treatment of his disability, informed them that he was disabled and informed them that all the medications were prescribed by his doctors.  The officers did not request the names of Plaintiff’s internist or psychiatrist, nor did they inquire about the nature and history of his disability. 

31.              At all times Plaintiff was alert, responsive and articulate.  At no time did the officers attempt to  call any crisis intervention personnel or even sit down and talk to Plaintiff long enough to determine his true condition. 

32.              The officers left Plaintiff’s home apparently satisfied that he was not a suicide risk.  However, about 10-15 minutes later the officers returned.  When Plaintiff answered the door, one of the officers was standing at the door sideways hiding his right hand that appeared to be holding something.  The officer at the door sidled into Plaintiff’s home sideways (hiding his right hand) and said to Plaintiff, “You don’t remember me, do you?”  Plaintiff said that he did remember the officer.  When the officer moved towards Plaintiff and touched his shoulder, Plaintiff became immediately unconscious and recalls nothing thereafter except standing outside his front door, facing the door with his head down and being handcuffed.  He was not told what had happened to him physically, why he was being handcuffed, where he was to be taken or anything else.   Prior to falling unconscious, Plaintiff was not physically injured in any manner.

33.              Plaintiff later learned that the City Defendants called South High School, where Plaintiff’s son, Ryan, was a freshman student, told school personnel that Plaintiff had attempted suicide and asked to talk to Ryan.  They then told Ryan that “Your father is in the hospital but he is OK”.  In this manner, Ryan learned second-hand that his father had allegedly attempted suicide.  The City Defendants did nothing to assure Ryan’s care and welfare.  He spent the next eight days with his basketball coach and his family. 

TMMC Confinement (3/16-3/19)

34.              Plaintiff remained unconscious after being handcuffed and eventually awoke in the emergency room at Torrance Memorial Medical Center (“TMMC”).  When Plaintiff sat up he noticed that his hospital gown was splattered with blood.  The left side of the gown near his left elbow was saturated with blood, the skin had been rubbed off to the bone and his front teeth had been pushed into his front lip so badly it was bleeding into his mouth.  The only other person in the room was a nurse’s aide who would only tell Plaintiff that he “had a seizure”.  Despite Plaintiff’s demands he was not permitted to talk to a doctor, to find out his diagnosis, course of treatment or the nature of the drugs being intravenously injected.  Plaintiff was catheterized and on an IV and could not move.  Shortly after awaking, Plaintiff was given an MRI and x-rays.  Records obtained after Plaintiff’s release indicated normal brain function without any indication of recent abnormalities such as a seizure.  The x-ray was negative except for a notation of a possible fracture of Plaintiff’s left rib. 

35.              According to TMMC records, the City Defendants gave the Hospital Defendants information that (1) Plaintiff was brought in due to a possible alcohol overdose, (2) Plaintiff called the Torrance Police Department alleging he had made a suicide attempt and/or (3) City Defendants witnessed Plaintiff have a seizure and fall (which such Defendants could use to explain Plaintiff’s physical injuries).  In its own records, the TMMC Defendants identified Plaintiff’s “chief complaint” as depression. 

36.              TMMC is a licensed “acute care hospital,” but not a “facility designated by the County and approved by the State Department of Mental Health as a facility for 72-hour treatment and evaluation” as required by California Welfare & Institutions Code §5150 for the compulsory incarceration for evaluation and treatment for up to 72 hours of persons who are suffering from a mental disorder so severe that they constitute a threat to themselves or to others. (This section and related ones are herein collectively referred to as “5150.”).  As such, the TMMC Defendants violated California Health & Safety Code Section 1799.111 (herein “Section 1799.111.) by keeping Plaintiff confined for more than eight hours without any attempt to transfer him to a 72-hour facility  At the time of his admission to TMMC, Plaintiff did not know about the provisions of 5150 or that he was confined pursuant to that law.  He was not given any of the disclosures required by 5150 and related statutes.  Plaintiff knew nothing about his diagnosis and prognosis for the entire three days he remained confined to TMMC, because the physician assigned to him, Defendant Doost, refused all requests by Plaintiff for an evaluation of his condition, refused to tell him why he was hospitalized or to talk to him at all.  Plaintiff was not informed that the medication was being injected intravenously or what medications he was being given.  TMMC records indicate that they were a mix of Haldol (a major anti-psychotic), Ativan (a relaxant) and Benedril (an anti-allergic).  These medications made speech generally impossible for Plaintiff and kept him asleepor groggy most of the time. 

37.              Plaintiff remained immobile, catheterized, injected with major tranquilizers for over three days, denied any information regarding his diagnosis, watched by “sitters” 24 hours per day, lacked any privacy, remained uninformed regarding his condition or the medications he was being injected with and without any telephone access to check on the condition of his son.  Plaintiff was not allowed to see the hospital’s PET team, to speak to a psychiatrist or have the benefit of any psychiatric evaluation.  Plaintiff’s son stated that he visited Plaintiff each day but Defendant does not remember those visits or any other events during the time he was held. 

38.              Defendant Doost’s initial Admission Report stated that Plaintiff was admitted for “suicidal ideation,” but she also conceded in the report that Plaintiff did not evidence any symptoms of suicidal ideation.  She then concluded that Plaintiff was “psychotic” without substantiating her conclusion with any empirical evidence.  This untrue statement was apparently used to justify Plaintiff’s incarceration and continued involuntary confinement under 5150, notwithstanding that 5150 does not authorize involuntary confinement based on such grounds.  Plaintiff’s confinement was thus, ipso facto, unlawful. 

39.              Plaintiff consistently denied any suicidal intention at every opportunity. 

40.              The radiology results at TMMC reported no evidence of any kind of seizure, but did indicate the existence of a fracture of the anterior aspect of the left sixth rib. 

41.              All of Plaintiff’s physical injuries occurred when he was unconscious, handcuffed and in the custody of the law enforcement officers. 

42.              TMMC records indicate that Doost was instructed by the Torrance Police Department to place Plaintiff on a 72-hour hold.  Doost acted in accordance with those instructions in utter disregard of procedural requirements, Plaintiff’s constitutional rights as specified under Section 5150 or the requirements of Health and Safety Code §1799.111 prohibiting an acute care hospital from detaining a patient pursuant to Section 5150. 

43.              TMMC is a licensed “acute care hospital” but not a “designated 72-hour facility.”  As such, Doost and TMMC violated Section 1799.111 by keeping Plaintiff confined for more than eight hours (See Section 1799 111(3) without transferring him to a 72-hour facility or recording in detail its failed attempts to do so.  This section also requires the facility to abide by the standards for giving patients anti-psychotic drugs, which it did not do.  It also appears from the TMMC records that Doost even denied, or discouraged, the PET team from assessing Plaintiff due to his “psychotic” condition.   Plaintiff contends that any “psychotic” appearing condition was brought about by the use of, or overdose of, Haldol and Ativan.  Doost is not a trained psychiatrist and Plaintiff disputes her professional qualifications to even label him “psychotic” or to prescribe anti-psychotic drugs. 

44.              TMMC ignored each of the notice and procedural requirements of 5150 when Plaintiff was admitted for treatment as required by, e.g., W&I sections: 5157(b); 5157(c); 5157(d); 5152(c), and TMMC failed to provide the services required under W&I section 5152.  TMMC failed to provide any medical care or treatment whatsoever except for the initial examinations, billed Plaintiff’s insurance company $22,000 for Plaintiff’s detention and totally ignored Section 1977.111, a provision that directly affects TMMC’s operations and one which should be well known by any acute care hospital in California. 

45.              On or about March 18, 2005, Plaintiff was visited in his room by Defendant Wojec, who immediately informed Plaintiff that the commission of suicide is a crime in California and the Plaintiff was guilty of attempting to do so.  She refused to listen to Plaintiff’s protestations and then left the room. 

46.              On March 19, 2005, Plaintiff’s catheter and IV were removed, Plaintiff was told to get dressed and that he was being transferred to Del Amo Hospital for a few days “for recovery.”  No discharge summary was prepared by Doost or any other attending physician at TMMC. 

47.              Pursuant to Section 5150, TMMC was required to fill out a written application for Plaintiff’s admission and the reasons therefor.   TMMC violated the law by not preparing one and Del Amo violating the law by not requiring one.  On information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that the City Defendants called both TMMC and Del Amo and arranged Plaintiff’s transfer to Del Amo without complying with Section 5150 or any other permissive law. 

48.              Plaintiff was then forcibly escorted to waiting orderlies, placed on a gurney, put into an ambulance and taken to Del Amo Hospital where he was immediately met by Defendant Wojec.  Plaintiff was then involuntarily admitted.

49.              On information and belief, TMMC has no records concerning Plaintiff’s confinement beyond March 16, 2004, no medication history or notes, no record of treatment, no discharge papers and no discharge summary prepared by Doost or anyone else. 

Del Amo Confinement (3/19-3/25/05)

50.              When Plaintiff was admitted to Del Amo he was heavily sedated by Haldol, Atavan and Benedril and unable to express his thoughts cogently.  While at Del Amo, Plaintiff remained sedated against his will for the duration of his incarceration and was never informed about the nature and effect of the medication he was being given.  During the three days spent at TMMC and the eight days at Del Amo, Plaintiff never received any of his prescribed medications for his disorder.  There is no evidence in Del Amo’s records that any hospital representative ever spoke with either Plaintiff’s internist or psychiatrist. 

51.              Plaintiff’s confinement at Del Amo began on March 19, 2005, at 4:05 pm and his 72-hour confinement should have ended on March 22, 2005, according to Del Amo’s incorrect interpretation of 5150.  However, Plaintiff was held until March 25, 2005, when Plaintiff was ordered to be released by a Superior Court hearing officer in a “Reise Hearing”.  Section 5150 requires a 72-hour facility give the patient notice of a fourteen day extension if kept longer than 72 hours.  Although Plaintiff was held longer than 72 hours, he never received a notice or explanation for the extended stay. 

 

Del Amo Provides No Diagnosis, Treatment, Therapy

or Proper Medications; Required Notices Not Given.

 

52.              At Del Amo, Plaintiff did not receive any therapy or treatment.  About four times he was called in to see Defendant Prover. At the first session Prover went through the list of Plaintiff’s prescribed medications and scratched all of them off his list because he “didn’t like them.”  Prover did not inform Plaintiff about the medications he later prescribed.  The remaining three sessions consisted of arguments between Prover and Plaintiff regarding when Plaintiff would be released.  Provert told Plaintiff that he would not be released until a court ordered it regardless of his mental condition.  Prover also admitted that he received compensation for every day Plaintiff remained at Del Amo.  He also stated that “no one in here has any Constitutional rights”.  Prover never attempted to provide any psychiatric treatment and these sessions lasted ten minutes at the most. 

53.              Mental Health facilities are required by law to give patients “reasonable access” to telephones.  Del Amo made it virtually impossible for a patient to call out or for an outsider to call in to a patient.  The ward had two pay telephones that cost $25/minute.  Plaintiff only had a $20 bill and the staff refused to make change.  Also, the telephones were taken off their hooks during “therapy” and not replaced unless a patient thought about it.  The ringers were set so low that they could be heard only if a patient was standing next to a telephone decided to answer it and look for the person called. 

54.              Conditions at Del Amo were substandard.  Patients slept in individual green painted square rooms with a rubber mattress and an armoire without hangers in prison-like conditions.  The light switches for the room lights were outside the doors in the hall.  Each door had a window about 8”x12”, double-paned with chicken wire between and a sliding door on the outside allowing the staff to see in whenever they chose.  During the night, staff would enter rooms and shine flashlights in the faces of the sleeping inpatients.  The food was served in Styrofoam containers and was always cold. 

55.              During Plaintiff’s stays at TMMC and Del Amo he received no mental or physical treatment whatsoever.  No doctor or staff member ever interviewed Plaintiff or even mentioned the words “danger to self” or “suicide” or recommended any course of treatment. 

Plaintiff Released Following Reise Hearing. 

56.              Plaintiff remained involuntarily confined at Del Amo, despite his continuing protests, from March 19th until March 25, 2005, the first date he could arrange for a “Reise” hearing (Case #LPS05006386).  The Commissioner of the Superior Court who reviewed all of Plaintiff’s records, held that Plaintiff was not a threat to himself or to others and ordered him to be immediately released.  The Commissioner also severely chastised Del Amo three times for its “inadequate admissions procedures” with respect to Plaintiff’s cause for admission to Del Amo.  The Commissioner’s determination has never been appealed and is now final.

57.              Immediately following the Commissioner’s order, Plaintiff was given back his personal effects and the pink carbon copy of a document entitled “medications instructions/prescriptions” dated march 25, 2005.  At the bottom of the form it states “discharge/aftercare plan”.  It was completed by Defendant Friedmann, who prescribed all of Plaintiff’s usual medications that he had been denied during his incarceration.  Friedmann stated the nature of Plaintiff’s problem as “bi-polar.  The form Friedmann signed stated that “The doctors who treated you in the hospital are” and he listed himself as psychiatrist, “Dee D.” as counselor and Perez Silva MD as internist.  No reference was made to Defendant Prover. 

58.              Following discharge, Plaintiff obtained a copy of the Del Amo records.  There exists a detailed “Admission Report” prepared but unsigned by a Manolito Fidel, MD.  Plaintiff never met Dr. Fidel.  Dr. Fidel billed Plaintiff’s Medicare for his examination.  Plaintiff challenged it and the charge was reversed.  The “History & Physical” was signed by Kasey Kim, MD who Plaintiff also never met. 

59.              Not only did Del Amo not provide any treatment, on information and belief, the Del Amo Defendants falsified and altered their medical records in violation of California law.  They also interfered with Plaintiff’s continuing treatment by refusing to turn over their daily psychiatrists’ notes and discharge summary. 

The April 9 Incident: Arrest for “Assaulting an Officer.” 

60.              Eight days after returning home from Del Amo, Plaintiff began experiencing severe post-traumatic stress, unreasonable paranoia that the police would break into his house, lack of sleep, inability to eat and manic-depressive episodes.  In the meantime, there was no one to help care for Plaintiff’s son, Ryan, and Plaintiff had to act as if nothing was amiss and maintain his schedule as well.  Ryan was traumatized at the thought that his father might die so soon after his mother’s recent death. 

61.              Around 4:00 pm on April 9, 2005, Ryan was at the YMCA and Plaintiff was sitting in his home office on a lounge chair almost blacked out after attempting to clean out closets and his office.  When Ryan returned, Plaintiff asked Ryan to call 9ll, which he did.  Plaintiff had suffered dangerously low blood pressure before and the feeling was the same.  Shortly thereafter, five officers of the Torrance Police Department (Does 3 through 9 and/or Torrance Fire Department (Does 16 through 22) pushed their way through the front door and rushed into Plaintiff’s home office where Plaintiff was sitting on a reclining chair.  The office is located at the back of the house and is 8’ x 10’ with built in bookcases and a desk that makes the room crowded with three people in it. 

62.              Plaintiff did not have his glasses on and woke up to see three men with blue uniforms standing and just looking down at Plaintiff.  They said absolutely nothing.  None of these officers were wearing badges that Plaintiff could detect and none was dressed like paramedics usually are or carrying a paramedic’s first aid kit. None of them asked Plaintiff what was wrong, whether he had trouble breathing or even took his pulse.  They just stared as though looking to pick a fight.  Plaintiff, who was ill at the time, was initially extremely disappointed at the lack of medical care and then recalled the beating and illegal incarceration eight days before.  Plaintiff yelled at the officers that they were trespassing and to leave, but they refused to do so.  Plaintiff then swung his right arm from a sitting position out of self-defense, frustration and fear for his safety and hit Defendant Millea in the thigh with his hand.  Millea was standing next to Plaintiff and to his right.  Millea and one other fireman then in unison, yelled “assaulting an officer.”  Millea was standing at the office door, turned around, and told the other Defendants in the adjoining room “He hit me!  You saw that, didn’t you?  He hit me!”  None of these men identified themselves as firemen, paramedics or police officers. 

63.              The Defendants first held Plaintiff to his chair and then wrestled him to the floor, bound his legs with a strap and held his arms behind his back and then handcuffed him.  After Plaintiff was handcuffed Defendant Millea tightened his left handcuff to the maximum, causing excruciating pain.   Plaintiff then asked Millea whether he was trying to hurt him.  Defendant replied “Yes”.  The handcuff-torture pinched the radial nerve in Plaintiff’s hand, causing him to suffer a severe pain and later a case of tendonitis which has requiring Plaintiff to seek medical treatment. 

64.              Plaintiff was thereupon transported, against his will and over his protests, to Harbor General-UCLA Hospital (“Harbor General”).  The officers carried Plaintiff out of his home “hog-tied”, upside down and threw him on his back onto a gurney with full restraints into a large Gerber ambulance. Being tossed on his back caused even more excruciating pain to his handcuffed left hand.  All this was accomplished in full view of his neighbors and Plaintiff’s horrified young son who, once again, was left to call his grandparents for help. 

65.              The officers deliberately used excessive force on Plaintiff. Plaintiff is 58 years old, 5’7” tall and about 160 pounds.  The firemen were about 15 to 25 years younger than Plaintiff, in good physical condition, and the force used to detain Plaintiff was excessive and unnecessary.  Five members of the Torrance Fire Department (Millea and Does 16 through 19), and one member of the Torrance Police Department (Doe 4) participated in subduing Plaintiff and then accompanied Plaintiff in the ambulance that took him from his home.  These officers refused to tell Plaintiff where they were taking him and also refused to give their names or to show him their name tags, badges or otherwise identify themselves.  One fire officer sitting directly in my line of sight was dressed in a blue uniform with no identification on it – not even a Torrance Fire Department patch on the sleeve.  Plaintiff told the officers that they had no probable cause to arrest him, but nothing Plaintiff said was acted upon.

66.              The admission form at Harbor General indicates that they were informed that Plaintiff had been hospitalized three times in the last thirty days as the result of a mental disorder. 

67.              When the firemen were dragging Plaintiff out of the ambulance at Harbor General, Defendant Millea showed Plaintiff what appeared to be a police dossier on Plaintiff, held it up to his face and said "this is your key".  It stated that Plaintiff’s next door neighbor of 17 years, John Spindler, a retired Torrance Police Department officer, reported to the police that Plaintiff is a homosexual, that the Plaintiff performed sexual acts in front of his teen-age son, Ryan, and that Plaintiff sexually abused him. 

68.              Plaintiff was next transported to College Hospital in Cerritos and again checked in pursuant to Section 5150 as “a harm to others”.  Plaintiff was released after 48 hours due to a finding that Plaintiff was not a threat to others and, once again, returned home to his now-hysterical son, his reputation defamed both in his community and with his family.  Word had also circulated at Plaintiff’s son’s high school that the father of Ryan Matthews (an “A” student and member of the football and wrestling teams) had a lunatic father who was carried away by the Torrance Police.  Plaintiff will never be able to live down that reputation or to heal the emotions of his son.  Nor can he afford to move to another neighborhood, for financial reasons. 

Plaintiff Files a Claim (5/25/05).

69.              On May 10, 2005, Plaintiff sent a detailed 7-page Certified letter to Defendant Police Chief James D. Herren complaining of the abusive treatment he received at the hands of the Torrance Police Department and advising him that Plaintiff had contacted, and complained to, the Justice Integrity Office of the LA County DA’s office, the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department in Washington D.C., and the FBI, as well as the Torrance City Attorney.  The letter concluded by warning of a possible lawsuit under the ADA and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 

70.              On May 25, Plaintiff submitted a formal claim to Defendant City for assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, kidnapping, conspiracy, and willful violations of the ADA and of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for the injuries, disability, losses, and damages suffered and incurred by him/her by reason of the above-described occurrence, all in compliance with the requirements of Section 905 of the Government Code.  In violation of the applicable provisions of law, Defendant Herren did not submit Plaintiff’s citizen’s complaint (properly filed on the City’s form) to the department’s Internal Review Board and communicate to Plaintiff the results of their inquiry or any legitimate reason they had decided no to take action.  If there was an inquiry, no one contacted Plaintiff. 

 

Police Retaliation:  Criminal Complaint and Trial (on 10/6/05).

71.              On June 7, 2005, Lt. Michael F. Paolozzi, Commander, Detective Division, sent a letter to Plaintiff advising him that a warrant had been issued for his arrest (the “Warrant Notification Letter”) and a copy of the warrant.  Neither the letter nor the warrant specified the charges or included a copy of the complaint. 

72.              The criminal complaint filed against Plaintiff alleged three counts based on the April 9 incident: (I) Using force upon a fireman while performing his duties (P.C. §242/243(b)); (II) resisting/ delaying/obstructing an officer in the performance of his duties (P.C. §148(a)(1); and (III) simple battery on a fireman. (P.C. §242). 

73.              At his jury trial on October 6, 2005, the Court dismissed Count I for legal insufficiency and Count III “in the interests of justice.” 

74.              By dismissing Count I, the court held that the Defendants in Plaintiff’s home were not paramedics, not acting in the course of their duties and were trespassing. 

75.              At the conclusion of the jury trial, Plaintiff was convicted on Count II, based upon his resisting the police officers’ attempt to handcuff him.  He was subsequently sentenced to a $3,500 fine, placed on three years probation and 52 days each of psychological and anger management sessions.  The alternative to a failure to satisfy the conditions of probation on each count is 52 days in jail.  Plaintiff was also enjoined from calling 911 unless there is a “bona fide” emergency.  Plaintiff has appealed the criminal conviction on, among other grounds, judicial bias, erroneous rulings, the failure to dismiss Count II along with Count I and excessive sentencing. 

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(Assault against Defendants City and Does 3 through 30)

 

76.              Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all of the preceding Paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 

77.              On or about April 9, 2005, at Torrance, California, Defendants Does 3 through 15 and/or Does 16 through 30 placed Plaintiff in fear of a harmful or offensive contact, as hereinabove alleged. 

78.              In doing the acts as alleged above, Defendant’s intended to cause or to place Plaintiff in apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact with Plaintiff’s person. 

79.              As a result of Defendants’ acts as alleged above, Plaintiff, in fact, was placed in great apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact with Plaintiff’s person. 

80.              In doing the acts as alleged above, Defendants acted with the intent to make a contact with Plaintiff’s person and did, in fact, batter Plaintiff while in police custody, handcuffed and unconscious. 

81.              In doing the things herein alleged, Defendants Does 3 through 15 and Does 16 through 30 were acting within the course and scope of their employment as agents, employees and representatives of Defendant City. 

82.              At no time did Plaintiff consent to any of the acts of Defendants alleged herein. 

83.              As a proximate result of the foregoing acts of Defendants, Plaintiff was hurt and injured in his health, strength, and activity, sustaining injury to his nervous system and person, all of which have caused, and continue to cause, Plaintiff great mental, physical, and nervous pain and suffering.  Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that these injuries have aggravated his pre-existing physical and mental disabilities.  As a result of all of the foregoing injuries, Plaintiff has suffered actual and general damages in an amount to be proved at trial. 

84.              As a further proximate result of Defendant’s acts, Plaintiff has been damaged in that he has suffered, and will continue to suffer, extreme mental and emotional distress. 

85.              As a further proximate result of Defendant’s acts, Plaintiff has been further damaged in that he has been required to retain the services of professional persons to treat his medical, mental and emotional injuries. 

86.              The aforementioned conduct of Defendants was willful and malicious and was intended to oppress and cause injury to Plaintiff.  Plaintiff is therefore entitled to an award of punitive damages. 

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(Battery Committed By Unlawful Arrest against Defendants City and Does 1 through 15)

 

87.              Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all of the preceding Paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 

88.              On or about March 16, 2005, as hereinabove alleged in detail, Defendants Does 1 and 2, without probable cause, arrested Plaintiff and rendered him unconscious by the use of excessive and unnecessary force on Plaintiff’s person. 

89.                In doing the acts alleged above, Defendants acted with the intent to make a harmful and painful contact with Plaintiff’s person. 

90.              In doing the things herein alleged, Defendants Millea and Does 1 through 30 were acting within the course and scope of their employment as agents, employees and representatives of Defendant City. 

91.                At no time did Plaintiff consent to any of the acts of Defendants alleged herein. 

92.                As a proximate result of the acts of Defendants as hereinabove alleged, Plaintiff was hurt and injured in his health, strength, and activity, sustaining injury to his nervous system and person, all of which have caused, and continue to cause, Plaintiff great mental, physical, and nervous pain and suffering.  Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that these injuries have aggravated his pre-existing physical, emotional and mental disabilities.  As a result of these injuries, Plaintiff has suffered general damages in an amount to be proved at trial. 

93.              As a further proximate result of Defendants’ acts, Plaintiff has been damaged in that he has suffered, and will continue to suffer, extreme mental and emotional distress. 

94.              As a further proximate result of Defendants’ acts, Plaintiff has been further damaged in that he has been required to retain the services of professional persons to treat his medical, mental and emotional injuries. 

95.              The aforementioned conduct of Defendants was willful and malicious and was intended to oppress and cause injury to Plaintiff.  Plaintiff is therefore entitled to an award of punitive damages. 

 

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(Battery Committed By Unlawful Arrest against

Defendants City, Millea and Does 1 through 30)

 

96.              Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all of the preceding Paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 

97.              On or about April 9, 2005, as hereinabove alleged in detail, Defendant Millea and Defendants Does 1 through 30, without probable cause, arrested Plaintiff and used excessive and unnecessary force on Plaintiff’s person, and thereafter deliberately and with intent to inflict harm and pain to Plaintiff, affixed handcuffs so tightly as to physically injure Plaintiff. 

98.              In doing the acts as alleged above, Defendants acted with the intent to make a harmful and painful contact with Plaintiff’s person. 

99.              In doing the things herein alleged, Defendants Does 3 through 15 and Does 16 through 30 were acting within the course and scope of their employment as agents, employees and representatives of Defendant City. 

100.          At no time did Plaintiff consent to any of the acts of Defendants alleged herein. 

101.          As a proximate result of the acts of Defendants as hereinabove alleged, Plaintiff was hurt and injured in his health, strength, and activity, sustaining injury to his nervous system and person, all of which have caused, and continue to cause, Plaintiff great mental, physical, and nervous pain and suffering.  Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that these injuries have aggravated his pre-existing physical and mental disabilities.  As a result of these injuries, Plaintiff has suffered general damages in an amount to be proved at trial. 

102.          As a further proximate result of Defendants’ acts, Plaintiff has been damaged in that he has suffered, and will continue to suffer, extreme mental and emotional distress. 

103.          As a further proximate result of Defendants’ acts, Plaintiff has been further damaged in that he has been required to retain the services of professional persons to treat his medical, mental and emotional injuries. 

104.          The aforementioned conduct of Defendants was willful and malicious and was intended to oppress and cause injury to Plaintiff.  Plaintiff is therefore entitled to an award of punitive damages. 

 

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(Use Of Unreasonable Force In Effecting Arrest against Defendants City and Does 1 and 2)

 

105.          Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all of the preceding Paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.    

106.          On or about March 16, 2005, Does 1 and 2, without probable cause, arrested Plaintiff and rendered him unconscious by the use of excessive and unnecessary force on his person. 

107.          Plaintiff would have willingly submitted to arrest had he been given the opportunity to do so, but instead he was deprived of that opportunity by Defendants’ rendering him unconscious before making the arrest. 

108.          In doing the things herein alleged, Defendants Millea and Does 1 through 30 were acting within the course and scope of their employment as agents, employees and representatives of Defendant City. 

109.          At no time did Plaintiff consent to any of the acts of Defendants alleged herein. 

110.          As a proximate result of the acts of Defendants as hereinabove alleged, Plaintiff was hurt and injured in his health, strength, and activity, sustaining injury to his nervous system and person, all of which have caused, and continue to cause, Plaintiff great mental, physical, and nervous pain and suffering.  Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that these injuries have severely aggravated his pre-existing physical, emotional and mental disabilities.  As a result of these injuries, Plaintiff has suffered special and general damages in an amount to be proved at trial. 

111.          As a further proximate result of Defendants’ acts, Plaintiff has been damaged in that he has suffered, and will continue to suffer, extreme mental and emotional distress. 

112.          As a further proximate result of Defendants’ acts, Plaintiff has been further damaged in that he has been required to retain the services of professional persons to treat his medical, mental and emotional injuries. 

113.          The aforementioned conduct of Defendants was willful and malicious and was intended to oppress and cause injury to Plaintiff.  Plaintiff is therefore entitled to an award of punitive damages. 

 

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(Use Of Unreasonable Force In Effecting Arrest

against Defendants City, Millea and Does 1 through 30)

 

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all of the preceding Paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  . 

114.          On or about April 9, 2005, Defendants Millea and Does 1 through 30, without probable cause, arrested Plaintiff and rendered him unconscious by the use of excessive and unnecessary force on his person. 

115.          Thereafter, the said Defendants used further excessive force in attaching handcuffs so tightly that they caused Plaintiff serious and chronic pain, all as alleged in detail hereinabove. 

116.          In doing the things herein alleged, Defendants Millea and Does 1 through 30 were acting within the course and scope of their employment as agents, employees and representatives of Defendant City. 

117.          At no time did Plaintiff consent to any of the acts of Defendants alleged herein. 

118.          As a proximate result of the acts of Defendants as hereinabove alleged, Plaintiff was hurt and injured in his health, strength, and activity, sustaining injury to his nervous system and person, all of which have caused, and continue to cause, Plaintiff great mental, physical, and nervous pain and suffering.  Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that these injuries have aggravated his pre-existing physical, emotional and mental disabilities.  As a result of these injuries, Plaintiff has suffered special and general damages in an amount to be proved at trial. 

119.          As a further proximate result of Defendants’ acts, Plaintiff has been damaged in that he has suffered, and will continue to suffer, extreme mental and emotional distress. 

120.          As a further proximate result of Defendants’ acts, Plaintiff has been further damaged in that he has been required to retain the services of professional persons to treat his medical, mental and emotional injuries. 

121.            The aforementioned conduct of Defendants was willful and malicious and was intended to oppress and cause injury to Plaintiff, who is therefore entitled to an award of punitive damages. 

SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Against All Defendants)

 

122.          Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all of the preceding Paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 

123.          The Defendants herein engaged in outrageous and unprivileged conduct with the intent to cause Plaintiff to suffer emotional distress and/or with reckless disregard of the probability of causing Plaintiff to suffer emotional distress. 

124.          Plaintiff was present at the time the outrageous conduct occurred and the Defendants knew that the Plaintiff was present. 

125.          As a proximate result of Defendants’ acts, Plaintiff has been damaged in that he has suffered, and will continue to suffer, extreme mental and emotional distress. 

126.          The Defendants’ outrageous and unprivileged conduct was a cause of the emotional distress suffered by the Plaintiff.